FOREIGN POLICY

As with other countries, the foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates has as its fundamental goal the prosperity, stability, power and independence of the country and its citizens. It is affected, however, by two factors unique to the Emirates.

First, the UAE is a major producer of hydrocarbons. Proven recoverable oil reserves are estimated at 98.8 billion barrels, the third largest in the world, while its proven recoverable reserves of natural gas are estimated at 6 trillion cubic metres, the world's fourth largest. Although oil and gas now account for only 30-35 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), the resulting revenue still gives the UAE one of the highest per capita incomes in the world.

Secondly, the country commands the strategic Straits of Hormuz, through which the bulk of the world's oil exports pass every day. The UAE is also ideally situated to provide a transit point for goods for the whole region, including the emerging economies of Central Asia.
 
 

UAE Priorities and Interests

The key foreign policy priority is that of Gulf security. Continued tension in the area over the last 30 years has left the UAE with no choice but to focus on affairs close to home. It has done so within the framework of its second key priority, the promotion of ties with the other states of the peninsula. The outcome has been the creation of het (Arab) Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), established at a summit in the UAE capital of Abu Dhabi in 1981.

The Arab identity of the UAE is also important and is reflected in the country's approach towards the rest of the Arab world, with whom the promotion of relations represents a third foreign policy priority. Intimately related to this is the Israeli-Palestine conflict.

A fourth strand in foreign policy derives from a feeling of identification with fellow Muslims around the world.

Such priority reflect the beliefs and value systems of the leadership and the people of the UAE. These may be briefly summarised as a sense of Arab identity, a belief in Islam, and, arising directly from the latter, an underlying humanitarian approach.

The UAE's foreign policy also reflects economic interests. The UAE's major commercial partners include countries which are concerned to support the security of the Emirates. Thus the development of relations with the Western nations has long been a key component of UAE foreign policy while, in recent years, links have also been developed with Russia and other successors states of the Soviet Union.

Finally, UAE foreign policy reflects the fact that the country's size and location require it to work, wherever possible, in collaboration with others. Thus a major component is a belief in the necessity of supporting and working with and through international organisations.
 
 

The highest authority in the UAE is the Supreme Council of Rulers of the Emirates, which is ultimately responsible for foreign policy. In practice, foreign policy is overseen by the President, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. Ruler since 1966 of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed has been UAE President since 1971 and, in consequence, there has been a consistency in foreign policy for nearly three decades. While the continuity in foreign policy is most immediately recognisable through the person of the President, it reflects an underlying broad national consensus. This has the following basic characteristics.

The UAE carefully reviews issues and options before any action is taken, generally adopting a policy of promoting conciliation and of defusing confrontation and conflict. This derives from the nature of tribal society in Arabia which is essentially communal, requiring general consensus in order to survive.

At the same time, the UAE is prepared to act swiftly when the situation requires, and to stand alone on controversial issues. In August 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UAE was among the first of the Arab states to support an international military response.

The UAE is tolerant of different lifestyles as long as these do not threaten the basic values of the country and its people. This tolerance, coupled with a firm opposition to extremism, particularly of a religions origin, can be traced clearly in the UAE's foreign policy. Sheikh Zayed has been one of the most active of Muslim leaders in calling for a dialogue between Islam and Christianity, while in comments on Jerusalem he has forcefully noted that the city is holy to both Muslims and Christians.

Finally, since 1971 the UAE has become a major donor of development assistance and emergency relief aid. Much is given through support for international agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to which the UAE is one of the leading contributors.
 
 

The Conduct and Evolution of UAE Foreign Policy

The implementation of UAE foreign policy is best examined on a geographical basis. It should, however, be noted that the conduct of foreign policy has not been static over the course of the last three decades, a result of adapting to the changing global community.
 

The Gulf Co-operation Council States

Relations with other GCC member states have been a central feature of UAE foreign policy, pre-dating the formation of the Council itself in 1981. Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar all shared with the UAE foreign policy, pre-dating the formation of the Council itself in 1981. Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar all shared with the UAE a history of a close relationship with the United Kingdom prior to federation. In fact, it was originally proposed that the federation should include Qatar and Bahrain, and it was not until the summer of 1971 that they decided to opt for a separate international status. Abu Dhabi and Oman signed their first agreement on borders before 1971, but relations prior to federation were less intimate with Kuwait, although Kuwaiti leaders played an active role in the negotiations that led up to the establishment of the UAE.

Relations with Saudi Arabia in the pre-federation period were more complex. Saudi Arabia had no special historical relationship with Britain and also claimed territory that was part of Oman and Abu Dhabi. It welcomed British withdrawal but declined to recognise the UAE, pending a resolution of the territorial issue. An early UAE foreign policy priority was, therefore, the resolution of the border question. In 1974 an agreement was initialled and diplomatic relations were established.

The immediate impetus for the formation of the GCC was the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq the following year. Relations with Iran had already been adversely affected by Iranian occupation in 1971 of the UAE islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb, part of Ras al-Khaimah, and by the imposition on Sharjah of an unequal Memorandum of Understanding that allow an Iranian military presence on a third island, Abu Musa.

Since it was established, the GCC has made considerable progress in a wide range of fields. In the spheres of foreign policy and defence, this has largely been in response to the invasion of one of its members, Kuwait, by Iraq in 1990.

Despite the closeness of relations with its GCC partners, the UAE has sometimes taken a distinctively separate approach as a result of differing objectives, often reflecting the moral beliefs of its leadership, rather than a calculation of political interests. Thus in the late 1990s the country took a lead in calling for a re-assessment of United Nations sanctions asgainst Iraq, humanitarian concerns about the plight of the Iraqi people overriding more purely political considerations.
 

Iraq

From the outset, the UAE sought to establish cordial relations with Iraq, a fellow member of the Arab League and the most powerful Arab state in the Gulf, as well as being a fellow member of OPEC.

Thus when the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980, the UAE remained formally neutral although political support was given to Iraq through the framework of the GCC. After that conflict ended in 1988, ties remained friendly until early in 1990, when Iraq's President Saddam Hussein began to criticise both the UAE and Kuwait over oil policy. The UAE correctly interpreted thils as a threat to regional stability, its view being proven by the 3 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

In the aftermath of the invasion, the UAE demonstrated its commitment to the GCC principles of collective security. It was among the first of the Arab states to recognise publicly the necessity for a military response and participated actively in the allied coalition.

Following the liberation of Kuwait, the UAE made it clear that it supported the principle of Iraq's territorial integrity while backing a continuation of United Nations sanctions against Baghdad. As part of this process, the UAE continued to provide facilities for forces enforcing the sanctions and accepted into its ports a number of ships intercepted while trying to export items illegally from Iraq. When, in October 1994, Iraqi troops moved menacingly towards the Kuwaiti border, the UAE sent ground forces to Kuwait as a tangible indication of its support for its fellow GCC member.

As time passes, it became clear that the UN sanctions were failing, while the UAE also became concerned about the hardships being suffered by the civilian population. Looking further ahead, the UAE has recognised that, regardless of current problems, Iraq will remain an important player in the Gulf region, and is keen to heop to end its estrangement from the rest of the Arab world.

The UAE has, therefore, taken steps to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq, both through the Red Crescent Society and through other means, such as the introduction of a weekly ferry service between Dubai and Basra. In early 2000, the UAE restored diplomatic reltions with Baghdad, and embassies were re-opened in both capitals. In August 2000, Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan mae a first formal call by the UAE for the lifting of sanctions in Iraq.
 

Iran

The UAE has always south cordial ties with Iran, the impetus for this not only being a matter of wishing to establish good relations with a neighbour but also deriving from extensive commercial and historical links between the populations.

Attempts to implement this policy, however, were advesely affected by the renewal in the late 1960s of territorial claims by Iran to three of the UAE's islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa. While these claims had been effectively abandoned for several decades, the announcement by Britain in 1968 that it was to leave the Gulf prompted Iran's Shah to reviee the claim, and to make it clear that he would secure his objectives by force, if necessary.

At the end of November 1971, Iran invaded the Tunbs, killing a number of policemen and expelling the population, which fled to Ras al-Khaimah. In the case of Abu Musa, the Ruler of Sharjah was coerced into signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) under which Sharjah and Iran instituted an administrative division of the island. Neither side relinquished their claim to sovereignty, although the threat of coercion from Iran was in contravention of international law. The Iranian move was stoutly protested by the newly-formed UAE, which promptly took the issue to the United Nations.

During the 1970s, the UAE continued to assert its claim to the three islands, although without progress, since Iran declined to concede that any issue of sovereignty was at stake. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 was followed by the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. During this conflict, Iran further fortified the three occupied UAE islands and used them as military bases. During the 1990-1991 crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iran was critical of the participatio of the GCC states, including the UAE, in the Western-led alliance first to contain Iraq and then to free Kuwait. In the post-war period Iran stepped up the proces of rebuilding its military capabilities. The UAE viewed these developments with some concern, but continued to adopt a cautious approach.

In mid-1992, however, the issue of the islands came unexpectedly to the fore. Iran introduced a new rule that anyone disembarking on Abu Musa, even persons en route to the UAE side, required Iranian visas. The step was viewed as evidence of an Iranian intention to extend control over the whole islands. Reponding quickly, the UAE sought and obtained diplomatic support from theGCC and the League of Arab States and, after a short while, the Iranians backed down. The UAE then adopted a proactive approach to the issue, seeking support from other countries and international organisations. By the end of the 1990s, the UAE had won almost unanimous support from the international community for its desire that the issue be resolved.

The UAE has consistently emphasised that it will pursue its attempt to regain the islands only through peaceful means. While confident of the legitimacy of its claim, the UAE has put forward two suggestions on ways to resolve the dispute.

The first suggestion was that direct bilateral negotiations with Iran on the issue of sovereignty should take plae, offered with no pre-conditions except that agreement first be reched on a time limit for the discussions. This approach foundered on the Iranian refusal even to acknowledge that an issue of severeignty existed.

The second option was that the ownership of the islands be determined either by international arbitration or by reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The UAE has declared that it will accept any ruling as binding. Iran declined to accept this suggestion, even though it had itself suggested in the 1930s that the ICJ should examine the issue. International arbitration or reference to the ICJ can only be effective if both parties agree to accept the results. In consequence, in the UAE view, a resolution of the dispute can be achieved ony when there is a change of policy in Iran. By mid-2000, however, evidence of a change in attitude in Tehran was still lacking, with Iran continuing to develop installations on Abu Musa.
 

The Arab World and the Islamic World

Further afield, the maintenance of solidarity within the Arab world as a whole is an important tenet of UAE foreign policy. Thus while issues directly affecting the Gulf remain central to UAE policy, the broader issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the future of the Palestinian people is also of major significance. The UAE perceives the issue as a matter that directly impinges upon its interests, both its support for the concept of Arab nationalism and its support for the principles of the defence and restoration of human and civil rights.

The UAE did not participate with military units in the most recent of the Arab-Israeli wars, in October 1973. It did, however, play an important role through its initiation of an embargo by Arab oil producing states on the supply of oil to countries perceived as being aligned with Israel. The embargo was explained by Sheikh Zayed as being intended to show that 'Arab oil is not dearer than Arab blood', and that a loss of oil revenues was a small price to pay when other Arab countries were suffering heavy human losses. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the UAE supported the Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue. Thus, despite close ties with Egypt, it broke diplomatic relations with Cairo following the visit to Jerusalem by President Sadat and the subsequent peace agreement in 1979, although it was later to be among the first of the Arab states to call for a re-admission of Egypt into the Arab fold.

Following the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, the UAE supported the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and the Palestinians that commenced in Madrid in October 1991, noting that since the PLO was internationally acknowledged as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, it was for that leadership to determine its own course. On the issue of Jerusalem, however, the UAE has elaborated its own view, emphasising that the future of the city should take into account not only its territorial status but also its international status as a city holy to Muslims and Christians.

On the question of relations between Israel and the Arab states, the UAE has followed a cautious approach, starting that a full normalisation of relations must await the conclusion of a satisfactory overall peace greement between Israel and its immediate neighbours.

More broadly, since 1971, UAE foreign policy towards the Arab world has focused on the resolution of inter-Arab differences, reflecting the personal philosophy of President Sheikh Zayed who has offered his own good offices as a mediator on a number of occasions.

UAE foreign policy has also involved the recognition of a Muslim dimension to international affairs, this factor becoming of increasing importance in the 1990s. The provision of humanitarian aid to the people of Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo has been one example.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the UAE has developed increasingly close relations with the Muslim states of Central Asia. These relations include both the development of bilateral trade and investment.
 

South Asia

South Asia, broadly defined as the countries of the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan, has a special place in UAE foreign policy, particularly with relation to India and Pakistan. While seeking to maintain good relations with both states, the UAE has recognised that relations between the two have the potential to cause insecurity within the region. The UAE also paid close attention during the 1980s and 1990s to events in Afghanistan, although the conflicts in that country have prevented the development of relations. The UAE offered political support to the insurgency against the Soviet-backed communist regime, which collapsed in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Extracts from Sheikh Zayed's message to the eighteenth emegency Arab summit convened on 20 October 2000. For the first time since 1996. representatives of all 22 Arab countries attended the summit.

The summit, which we have been calling for a long time now, is the yardstick for our credibility and the credibility of all that we believe in. The deseration of Jerusalem demands that we bury all our differences. Because of this I call on you all to let forgiveness lead the way for a collective effort to forgle a uified Arab stand, capable of realising the dreams of our people. Our Arab people have expressed their anger at what the poalestinian people and going through, at all times denouncing Israeli violation of international resolutions and norms and disregard for sanctity of our holiest shrines. All these require us to take firm decisions not only to support the Palestinian people, but also to regain Arab solidarity and to prove that our nation is capable of taking appropriate steps to protect its rights and to defend its dignity. Day by day, we pay the price of the oppressor's might, an oppressor that is taking full advantage of the absence of a fair, unbiased broker who can enhance peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

The Palestinian cause is the core of conflict. Just and comprehensive peace has always been our strategic choice and we have been consistently calling for a just settlement that will retain the Palestinians right to set up their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, guarantee the return of all Palestinian refugees, and ensure the full recovery of Golan as well as a complete Israel withdrawal from all Lebanese territories, in accordance with Security Council's resolutions. We have always believed in this option but the blind logic of force is dominating the situation in Israel. Israeli policy, including its expansionist and settlement complex, selective application of agreements and continued aggression, has dashed all hopes of a real and comprehensive peae. Israel has not only dishonoured the agreements which constitute the minimum rights of the Palestinian people, but also tried to empty them of their content. Israel crowned these actions by descrating the Al Aqsa mosque, and this is a religious and cultural challenge not only for Muslims but also for the whole of humanity.

This summit provides the real opportunity to confirm that we are standing behind the Palestinian people not only by offering financial assistance, but also by taking a clear decisive and unified position before everything else.
 

Beyond the Region

Relations with Britain have always played an important part in UAE foreign policy, because of the historical relationship between the two countries. However, the establishment of the UAE in 1971 coincided with the withdrawal of Britain from 'East of Suez,' the culmination of a gradual process that had begun with the independence of India and Pakistan. Britain's privileged position in the Arabian Gulf faded as other major industrial powers expanded their involvement in the region.

This process was stimulated by two factors. First, the explosion in oil prices that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war prompted the UAE and other Gulf states to embark on a major development programme that offered considerable opportunities to firms from the industrialised powers. At the same time, there was a recognition abroad of the increasing importance of the OPEC group in the world economy.

Questions of regional security then came to the fore with the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. While, prior to that date, the United States had been content to rely upon Iran, its strongest ally in the region, the change prompted a more visible military presence both from the United States and from its British and French allies.

During the Iraq-Iran War from 1980 to 1988, the 'tanker war' against commercial shipping had a direct impact upon the interests of the UAE because of its reliance on maritime trade. The UAE welcomed the role played by Western navies in maintaining the freedom of passage for shipping both inside the Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz.

Following the war, defence agreements were concluded with the United States, Britain and France. All have played a part in the UAE's extensive military procurement programme.

Relations with the United States, in particular, developed strongly in the latter part of the 1990s, a process facilitated by gradual movement towards a settlement of the Arab-Isreali conflict. With its strong support for the Palestinians, the UAE continued, however, to criticise the US Government for what it perceived as a failure to adopt an even-handed approach.

The UAE has devoted considerable attention to eforts to strengthen international collective security, motivated in each case by humanitarian concerns. This aspect of foreign policy can be traced back to the 1970s, when the UAE provided a contingent for the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon during that country's civil war, while in the early 1990s the UAE responded to an invitation from the United Nations ro provide units for the UNISOM II peacekeeping operations in Somalia.

Following the eruption of the conflict in Bosnia, the UAE extended its interests further afield. The UAE believed that the lack of international intervention and the imposition of an arms embargo both on the Serbian Government and on Bosnia was permitting the killing to continue. With no sign of prompt international action to end Serbian attacks on Bosnia or to lift the embargo, the UAE began to assist the Bosnian Government to replenish its military arsenal, contributing to a stabilisation of the situation and to Bosnia's survival. The UAE then provided substantial assistance to help the country rebuild.

The UAE's interest in the Balkans was again stimulated by the conflict in Kosovo. Early in 1998, the Serbian Government launched offensives against the population of Kosovo, who, like the Bosnians, were also Muslims. Again calling for international intervention, the UAE began a major programme of humanitarian assistance.

When in early 1999, forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) commenced a campaign of aerial bombardment to persuade the Serbian Government to cease its offensive against the Kosovar population, the UAE was the first non-NATO state to express support for the operation. 

Once the bombing campaign was over and Serbian forces had withdrawn, responsibility for Kosovo was assumed by the United Nations, while peace-keeping operations were undertaken by a special international force, KFOR. The UAE was the only Muslim state to participate in KFOR, as well as being the only participating country, apart from Russia, outside NATO. The commitment was the first operational deployment of UAE forces outside the Middle East region. A number of issues and interests have remained central to UAE foreign policy since 1971. Many of these are, naturally, related to the Arabian Gulf region, the preservation of whose security is an essential component of the security of the UAE itself. At the same time, there have been major changes in the global arena, and in response to these changes, the way in which the UAE pursued its foreign policy objectives has evolved, both within the region and beyond.

When the UAE was established, its view of international affairs was fairly narrowly confined to the Gulf and the broader Arab region. Gradually, however, its political horizons expanded, a process that accelerated markedly during the 1990s. As a result, by the year 2000 the country was projecting the pursuit of its politicaal interests far further afield than would have been anticipated a few years earlier.

In the process the UAE has emerged as a state with a real role to play in international affairs. That, in turn, has been of benefit in winning widespread backing for its own position on key regional issues. The characteristic style of its foreign policy was established by President Sheikh Zayed but has now become a fundamental component of the nature of the state.