|
NATURAL
RESOURCES : Oil, Natural Gas, Minerals, Forest and Land Use
| Crude
oil reserves: |
96.40
billion barrels |
| Oil
production capacity: |
About
4.2 million barrels per day |
| Oil
production: |
3.727
million barrels per day |
| Oil
refining capacity: |
About
1.5 million barrels per day |
| Oil
Consumption (2000E): |
1.3
MMBD |
| Natural
gas reserves: |
26.31
trillion cubic meters |
| Gas
production capacity: |
About
90 billion cubic meters per year |
| Natural
gas consumption: |
59
billion cubic meters annually |
| Natural
gas refining capacity: |
About
190 million cubic meters |
| Petrochemical
production capacity: |
About
13 million tons per year |
| Net
Oil Exports (1H2000E): |
2.4
MMBD |
| Major
Crude Oil Customers (1H2000E): |
OECD
Europe, Japan, China, South Korea |
| Recoverable
Coal Reserves: |
213
million short tons (Mmst) |
| Coal
Production : |
1.02
Mmst |
| Coal
Consumption : |
1.66
Mmst |
| Net
Coal Imports : |
0.44
Mmst |
| Electric
Generation Capacity: |
26.8
gigawatts (91% thermal) |
| Electricity
Production : |
95.3
billion kilowatt-hours |
Iran
is OPEC's second largest oil producer and holds 9% of the world's
oil reserves and 15% of its gas reserves. Additionally, Iran is
a focal point for regional security issues.
Iran's
economy, which relies heavily on oil export revenues, was hit hard
by record-low oil prices during 1998 and early 1999, but with the
sharp rebound in oil prices over the past year, has begun to recover.
Besides persistent unemployment (over 15%) and inflation (30-35%),
other problems faced by Iran's economy include: a rapidly growing,
young population with limited job prospects; heavy dependence on
oil revenues (about half the state's budget and 80% of the country's
hard currency earnings); $12 billion in external debt (including
a high proportion of short-term debt); expensive state subsidies
on many basic goods; a large, inefficient public sector and state
monopolies (bonyads, which control 20% or more of the economy and
constitutionally are answerable only to supreme leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei); a serious drought; and international isolation and
sanctions.
In
September 1999, President Khatami (elected in a landslide in May
1997 on a reform agenda) announced an ambitious (and controversial)
program to privatize several major industries, including communications,
post, rail, petrochemicals, and even upstream oil and gas to an
extent, as part of the "total restructuring" of the Iranian economy
called for in the country's latest five-year economic plan (which
began in March 2000). The five-year plan also called for a wide
range of fiscal and structural reforms, including a partial float
of the rial, and aims to attract $10 billion in oil, gas, and petrochemicals
investment. Implementation of these plans, however, has been delayed
in the past by lack of domestic political consensus (as well as
the Iranian constitution), and likely will be in the future as well.
In November 1999, for example, the powerful (and conservative) "Council
of Guardians" rejected a bill which would have exempted foreign
companies in an offshore free-trade zone from threats of nationalization.
More recently, the Council of Guardians vetoed planned reforms to
Iran's mining sector.
Iran
is attempting to diversify by investing some of its oil revenues
in other areas. Iran also is hoping to attract billions of dollars
worth of foreign investment to the country by creating a more favorable
investment climate (although in 1999 it attracted only $1.1 billion,
down 10% from 1998 levels). This would involve a variety of measures,
including possible constitutional amendments, reduced "red tape,"
reduced restrictions and duties on imports, creation of free-trade
zones, and increased safety of foreign investments.
On
February 18, 2000, Iran held its sixth parliamentary elections since
the 1979 Islamic revolution, with an overwhelming victory for the
reformist coalition. In the wake of the election, U.S. President
Clinton called for a "constructive partnership with Iran." The effect
of Iran's elections on the country's energy sector at this point
remains uncertain.
SANCTIONS
The
US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 imposes mandatory and
discretionary sanctions on non-U.S. companies investing more than
$20 million annually in the Iranian oil and gas sectors. Also, in
1995, President Clinton signed executive orders prohibiting US companies
and their foreign subsidiaries from conducting business with Iran,
while banning any "contract for the financing of the development
of petroleum resources located in Iran." In response, U.S.-based
Conoco was forced to abrogate a $550-million contract to develop
Iran's offshore Sirri A and E oil and gas fields. Following this,
France's Total and Malaysia's Petronas were awarded the contract.
On August 19, 1997, Executive Order 13059 reaffirmed that virtually
all trade and investment activities by US citizens in Iran are prohibited.
In March 2000, US Secretary of State Albright announced that the
United States would lift certain sanctions against Iranian luxury
goods. Other sanctions remain in effect, however.
Several
countries have been looking to invest in the Iranian oil sector,
but have been awaiting expiry of ILSA in 2001. Japan, for instance,
sent a high-level delegation to Iran (Japan's third-largest oil
supplier) in August 2000 for energy talks aimed at deepening cooperation
between the two countries in energy development. Also, in March
2000, Japan's trade ministry (MITI) resumed long-term trade insurance
for Japanese companies in Iran.
CASPIAN
ENERGY
Iran
sees itself as a natural transit route for oil and gas exports from
the landlocked Central Asian countries to world markets. This vision
is complicated, however, by political considerations, particularly
the US policy opposing pipelines through Iran (the United States
has made the construction of an oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan
to Ceyhan, Turkey the centerpiece of its Caspian policy).
Aside
from acting as a transit center for other countries' oil and gas
exports from the Caspian, Iran has potentially significant Caspian
reserves of its own, including up to 15 billion barrels of oil and
11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. It is important to note,
however, that almost none of this is "proven" to be recoverable
(although preliminary seismic surveys conducted by Lasmo and Shell
indicated 2.5 billion barrels of oil). Currently, Iran has no oil
or gas production in the Caspian region.
CRUDE
SWAPS
In
order to get around restrictions in dealing with Iran, several firms
have proposed oil "swaps" involving the delivery of Caspian (Azeri,
Kazakh, Turkmen) oil to refineries in northern Iran, while the same
amount of Iranian oil is exported through Persian Gulf terminals.
According to Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar-Zangeneh, Iran is
planning to retool its oil infrastructure to accommodate such swaps,
including construction of a $400-million, 240-mile pipeline from
the Caspian area via Iran's Caspian port of Neka to refineries in
northern Iran SSS and to Tehran. In February 2000, the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) awarded a Chinese consortium (led by
Sinopec and CNPC)a $100-million contract for technical aspects of
the project, which is expected to transport 175,000 bbl/d of Caspian
crude within two years, and possibly up to 370,000 bbl/d (at a cost
of $220 million). European oil trading company Vitol is involved
in financing the project. Iran also plans to boost capacity at its
northern refineries at Arak, Tabriz, and Tehran to about 800,000
bbl/d to process this oil. In January 2000, US Ambassador to Azerbaijan,
Stanley Escudero, said that transit of oil from Azerbaijan would
be a "mistake."
| Energy |
| |
Petroleum
(thousand barrels per day)
|
Production
of Electricity (million kw/h) (1)
|
|
Production
|
Export(2)
|
Steam
|
Gas
and Combined Cycle
|
Hydro-
Electric
|
Diesel
|
Total
|
|
(Figures
in parentheses indicate percentage change over the previous
period)
|
|
1376
|
3,623
|
2,496
|
65,629
|
19,298
|
6,908
|
475
|
92,310
|
|
(0.4)
|
(-2.2)
|
(5.2)
|
(24.7)
|
(-6.3)
|
(22.1)
|
(7.6)
|
|
1377
|
3,666
|
2,333
|
63,988
|
26,487
|
7,014
|
374
|
97,862
|
|
(1.2)
|
(-6.5)
|
(-2.5)
|
(37.2)
|
(1.5)
|
(21.3)
|
(6.0)
|
|
1378
|
3,373
|
2,205
|
70,689
|
31,156
|
4,943
|
419
|
107,207
|
|
(-8.0)
|
(-5.5)
|
(10.5)
|
(17.6)
|
(-29.5)
|
(12.0)
|
(9.5)
|
|
1379s
|
3,762
|
2,605
|
77,846
|
33,302
|
3,637
|
359
|
115,144
|
|
(11.5)
|
(18.1)
|
(10.1)
|
(6.9)
|
(-26.4)
|
(14.3)
|
(7.4)
|
|
(Figures
in parentheses indicate percentage change over the previous
period)
|
| 1379s: |
|
Q1
|
3,637
|
2,501
|
18,920 |
7,764 |
1,014 |
101 |
27,831 |
|
(7.7)
|
(15.8)
|
(6.1) |
(29.0) |
(7.0) |
(29.5) |
(11.7) |
|
Q2
|
3,739
|
2,627
|
21,814
|
11,062
|
1,137
|
115
|
34,128
|
|
(2.8)
|
(5.0)
|
(15.3)
|
(38.9)
|
(12.1)
|
(13.9)
|
(21.9)
|
|
Q3
|
3,893
|
2,718
|
18,463
|
7,706
|
682
|
74
|
26,925
|
|
(4.1)
|
(3.5)
|
(15.4)
|
(-30.3)
|
(-40.0)
|
(35.7)
|
(-21.1)
|
|
Q4
|
3,777
|
2,575
|
18,649
|
6,570
|
804
|
69
|
26,092
|
|
(-3.0)
|
(-5.3)
|
(1.0)
|
(-14.7)
|
(18.1)
|
(-6.8)
|
(-3.1)
|
| 1380
: |
|
Q1s
|
3,560
|
2,381
|
19,343
|
9,226
|
1,088
|
82
|
29,739
|
|
(-5.7)
|
(-7.5)
|
(3.7)
|
(40.4)
|
(35.3)
|
(18.8)
|
(14.0)
|
|
Q2s
|
3,514
|
2,356
|
23,513
|
11,939
|
1,251
|
125
|
36,828
|
|
(-1.3)
|
(-1.0)
|
(21.6)
|
(29.4)
|
(15.0)
|
(52.4)
|
(23.8)
|
|
Q3
|
3,436
|
2,213
|
19,004
|
9,138
|
979
|
63
|
29,184
|
|
(-2.2)
|
(-6.1)
|
(19.2)
|
(-23.5)
|
(-21.7)
|
(49.7)
|
(-20.8)
|
| Source:
Ministry of Petroleum, Ministry of Energy |
(1)
Excludes electricity generated by large manufacturing establishments
and private institutions.
(2) Includes crude oil export and net
export of oil products. |
OIL
Iran
holds 90 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, or roughly 9% of
the world's total. The vast majority of Iran's crude oil reserves
are located in giant onshore fields in the Khuzestan region near
the Iraqi border and Persian Gulf terminus. Current Iranian production
is accounted for by the following fields: Ahwaz-Bangestan (250,000
bbl/d currently, with plans to increase to 600,000 bbl/d over the
next 8 years at a cost of $2.5 billion), Marun, Gachsaran, Agha
Jari, and Bibi Hakimeh. Most of Iran's crude oil is low in sulfur,
with gravities in the 30°-39° API range. During the first
seven months of 2001, Iran produced about 3.9 million bbl/d of oil,
around 100,000 bbl/d above its average output of 3.8 million bbl/d
for 2000. Iran's current sustainable crude oil production capacity
is estimated at around 3.9 million bbl/d, which is nearly 500,000
bbl/d above Iran's latest (September 1, 2001) OPEC production quota
of 3.406 million bbl/d. In August 2001, Iran's oil minister denied
a report (in Middle East Economic Survey) that Iranian production
had hit 4.1 million bbl/d. With consumption of about 1.2 million
bbl/d, Iran currently is a net exporter of around 2.7 million bbl/d.
Around half of Iran's oil exports go to Asian markets, with the
remainder going to Europe and Africa.
It
is possible that with sufficient investment, Iran could increase
its oil production capacity significantly. Iran produced 6 million
bbl/d in 1974, but has not surpassed 3.8 million bbl/d on an annual
basis since the 1978/79 Iranian revolution. It is believed that
Iran may have maintained production levels at some older fields
only by using methods which have permanently damaged the fields.
Also, Iran's oilfields are -- according to Oil Minister Zanganeh
-- experiencing a depletion rate of 250,000-300,000 bbl/d per year,
and are in need of upgrading and modernization. Despite these problems,
Iran has ambitious plans to double national oil production -- to
around 8 million bbl/d -- by 2020, and is counting on foreign investment
to do so. Over the next four years, Iran is aiming to double foreign
investment in the hydrocarbons sector to $24 billion.
In
October 1999, Iran announced that it had made its biggest oil discovery
in 30 years, a giant onshore field called Azadegan located in the
southwestern province of Khuzestan, a few miles east of the border
with Iraq. According to Iran's Oil Minister Zanganeh, the Azadegan
field could contain oil reserves of up to 24 billion barrels, with
potential production of 300,000-400,000 bbl/d. On November 1, 2000,
agreement was reached between Japan and Iran for Japanese firms
(Japex and Indonesia Petroleum, both majority-owned by the Japan
National Oil Company -- JNOC) to have priority negotiating rights
to develop Azadegan. In January 2001, the Majlis approved development
of Azadegan by foreign investors using the so-called "buyback" model
(see below). A contract was signed in July 2001. In September 2000,
the U.S. Treasury Department announced that it was investigating
Conoco to determine whether or not the company had violated U.S.
sanctions in helping to analyze seismic information collected on
Azadegan by NIOC.
Since
1995, NIOC has made several sizable oil discoveries, including the
huge (3-5 billion barrels) Darkhovin onshore oilfield, located near
Abadan and containing low sulfur, 39° API crude oil. In late
June 2001, Italy's ENI signed a nearly $1 billion, 5 1/2-year buy-back
deal to develop Darkhovin. ENI has a 60% stake in the project, with
NIOC holding the remaining 40%. Ultimately, production at Darkhovin
is expected to reach 160,000 bbl/d.
In
other news related to "buy-back" deals, Spain's Cepsa is set to
develop the Cheshmeh-Kosh field for $300 million. Cepsa is to raise
crude production at the field from 30,000 bbl/d to 80,000 bbl/d
within four years. Also, a deal to develop Bangestan is possible
in 2002. Bidders include TotalFinaElf, Shell, and BP.
In
February 2001, NIOC announced the discovery of a very large offshore
oil field, named Dasht-e Abadan, in shallow waters near the port
city of Abadan. According to a top NIOC official, Dasht-e Abadan
could contain reserves "comparable" in size to Azadegan.
FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
The
Iranian constitution prohibits the granting of petroleum rights
on a concessionary basis or direct equity stake. However, the 1987
Petroleum Law permits the establishment of contracts between the
Ministry of Petroleum, state companies and "local and foreign national
persons and legal entities." "Buyback" contracts, for instance,
are arrangements in which the contractor funds all investments,
receives remuneration from NIOC in the form of an allocated production
share, then transfers operation of the field to NIOC after the contract
is completed. This system has drawbacks for both sides: by offering
a fixed rate of return, NIOC bears all the risk of low oil prices.
If prices drop, NIOC has to sell more oil or gas to meet the compensation
figure. At the same time, companies have no guarantee that they
will be permitted to develop their discoveries, let alone operate
them. U.S. law permits American companies to buy the bid packages
($10,000 each), but not to submit proposals. In late August 2000,
Iran's deputy oil minister, Seyyed Mehdi Hoseyni, said that $8 billion
worth of buyback contracts on various oil reservoirs would be finalized
soon (an estimated $10 billion in buyback deals reportedly had been
signed to that point). Projects include the following oilfields:
Salman, Darkhovin, Sa'databad-Sarvestan, Cheshme-Kosh, Foroozan-Esfandiar,
and Dehloran. Recently, Iran appears to have had some second thoughts
about buybacks (including charges of corruption, insufficient benefits
to Iran, and also worries that buybacks are attracting too little
investment), and reportedly is considering substantial changes (or
even abolition) of the system. Also, as of April 2001, no buyback
contract had been signed for more than a year.
The
first major project under the buyback investment scheme became operational
in October 1998, when the offshore Sirri A oil field (operated by
Total and Malaysia's Petronas) began production at 7,000 bbl/d (Sirri
A currently is producing around 20,000 bbl/d). The neighboring Sirri
E field began production in February 1999, with production at the
two fields expected to reach 120,000 bbl/d.
In
April 1999, Iran awarded Canada's Bow Valley Energy, along with
the former Elf Aquitaine (now TotalFinaElf), a buyback contract
to develop the offshore Balal field. The field, which contains some
80 million barrels of reserves, will produce up to 40,000 bbl/d,
possibly by the end of 2002. In February 2001, ENI-Agip acquired
a 38.25% share in Balal from TotalFinaElf, which continues to hold
a 46.75% stake in the field. Bow Valley holds a 15% share.
In
March 1999, France's Elf Aquitaine and Italy's ENI/Agip were awarded
a $1-billion contract for a secondary recovery program at the offshore,
1.5-billion-barrel Doroud oil and gas field near Kharg Island. The
program is intended to boost production from current levels of around
130,000 bbl/d to as high as 220,000 bbl/d within four years.
In
November 2000, Norway's Statoil signed a series of agreements with
NIOC to explore for oil in the Strait of Hormuz area. The two companies
also will cooperate on developing a gas-to-liquids processing plant
for four southern onshore fields, and possibly will develop the
Salman offshore field at a cost of $850 million, with eventual production
of 130,000 bbl/d. Iran appears to be accelerating its plans to boost
production of natural gas liquids (NGL), as well as liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG). NGL expansion plans, including a $500 million plan to
build two NGL plans on the south coast of Iran, are aimed mainly
at making ethane feedstock available for Iran's growing petrochemical
industry.
As
of early October 2001, Australia's BHP Billiton Ltd. appeared close
to signing a $359 million buyback contract to develop Foroozan-Esfandiar.
BHP Billiton would be expected to increase production at the fields
three-fold, to 150,000 bbl/d, from around 50,000 bbl/d at present.
ONSHORE
DEVELOPMENTS
NIOC's
onshore field development work is concentrated mainly on sustaining
output levels from large, aging fields. Consequently, enhanced oil
recovery (EOR) programs, including gas injection, are underway at
a number of fields, including Marun, Karanj, and the presently inactive
Parsi fields. EOR programs will require sizeable amounts of natural
gas, infrastructure development, and financing.
Although
NIOC has run into difficulties in implementing EOR programs at some
of its fields mentioned above (i.e., Agha Jari, Binak, Kupal, and
Ramshahr) fields, it has been successful in many other cases. One
example is NIOC's development work at Gachsaran, which contains
in-place reserves of 53 billion barrels and a large-scale gas injection
capacity which should help increase production.
OFFSHORE
DEVELOPMENTS
The
Doroud 1&2, Salman, Abuzar, Foroozan, and Sirri fields comprised
the bulk of Iran's offshore output, all of which is exported. Iran
plans extensive development of existing offshore fields and hopes
to raise its offshore production capacity to 1.1 million bbl/d by
2003 (from around 600,000 bbl/d now). It is estimated that development
of new offshore Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea oil fields will require
investment of $8-$10 billion.
Aside
from acting as a transit center for other countries' oil and gas
exports from the Caspian, Iran has potentially significant Caspian
reserves of its own, including up to 15 billion barrels of oil and
11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. It is important to note,
however, that almost none of this is "proven" to be recoverable
(although preliminary seismic surveys conducted by Lasmo and Shell
indicated 2.5 billion barrels of oil). Currently, Iran has no oil
or gas production in the Caspian region, although in March 2001,
NIOC signed a $226-million deal with Sweden's GVA Consultants and
Iran's Sadra to build an oil rig in the Caspian Sea off Mazandaran
province. This marks Iran's first exploration attempt in the Caspian.
Iran's position is that the Caspian should be divided equally, as
opposed to several other Caspian states' position that median lines
should be used, as is done in lakes. As of October 2001, no agreement
has been reached among Caspian Sea region states on this matter.
On July 23, 2001, tensions flared in the Caspian Sea region when
an Iranian gunboat intercepted two BP oil exploration vessels off
Azerbaijan's coast. Following the incident, BP suspended exploration
in the disputed block (which Iran calls Alborz).
The
105-million barrel Balal field, discovered in the 1970s by an ARCO/Murphy
consortium, was never developed even though an oil pipeline connecting
the field to the Lavan Island export terminal was laid. As mentioned
above, Canada's Bow Valley Energy Ltd. is now conducting detailed
engineering work, including a 3-D seismic survey, on the Balal field.
Balal likely will require extensive water injection and other secondary
recovery methods, especially in later years.
On
November 14, 1999, Shell announced that it had been chosen for a
buyback project to develop the Soroush and Nowrooz offshore oil
fields, both of which were closed during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq
war. These fields are located offshore about 50 miles west of Kharg
Island and contain estimated recoverable reserves of around 1 billion
barrels of mainly heavy oil. Soroush was one of the original 11
projects put out for tender by NIOC in 1995, and the project calls
for Shell to increase output at Soroush-Nowrooz to 150,000 bbl/d
by 2003. As of September 2001, Shell reportedly was attempting to
move the $800 million Soroush-Nowrooz development project ahead
quickly, with first production now expected by November/December
2001.
NIOC
also would like to develop five oil and gas fields in the Hormuz
region (Henjam A (HA), HB, HC, HD, and HE), the A field near Lavan
Island, the Esfandir field near Kharg Island, and two structures
near the South Pars gas field. According to NIOC, the five Henjam
fields hold an estimated 400 million barrels of oil and have a production
potential of 80,000 bbl/d. Other Iranian oil fields slated for increases
include Doroud, Nosrat, Farzam, and Salman (to 130,000 bbl/d by
2004 from 105,000 bbl/d at present).
REFINING
AND TRANSPORTATION
As
of January 2001, Iran had nine operational refineries with a combined
capacity of 1.48 million bbl/d. In order to meet burgeoning domestic
demand for middle and light distillates, Iran has imported refined
products since 1982, and is attempting to boost its refining capacity
to 2 million bbl/d. Two planned grassroots refineries include a
225,000-bbl/d plant at Shah Bahar and a 120,000-bbl/d unit on Qeshm
Island. The $3-billion Shah Bahar refinery project was approved
by the government in late 1994 and would be built by private investors.
Iran
exports crude oil via four main terminals -- Kharg Island (by far
the largest), Lavan Island, Sirri Island, and Ras Bahregan. Refined
products are exported via the Abadan and Bandar Mahshahr terminals.
Many Iranian oil export terminals were damaged during the Iran-Iraq
War, but all have been rebuilt. Iran operates the largest oil tanker
fleet within OPEC, with 25 ships.
CRUDE
SWAPS
In
order to get around restrictions in dealing with Iran, several firms
have proposed oil "swaps" involving the delivery of Caspian (Azeri,
Kazakh, Turkmen) oil to refineries in northern Iran, while the same
amount of Iranian oil is exported through Persian Gulf terminals.
According to Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar-Zangeneh, Iran is
planning to retool its oil infrastructure to accommodate such swaps,
including construction of a $400-million, 240-mile pipeline from
the Caspian area via Iran's Caspian port of Neka to refineries in
northern Iran and to Tehran. In February 2000, the National Iranian
Oil Company (NIOC) awarded a Chinese consortium (led by Sinopec
and CNPC) a $100-million contract for technical aspects of the project,
which is expected to transport 175,000 bbl/d of Caspian crude by
the end of 2002, and possibly up to 380,000 bbl/d (at a cost of
$220 million). European oil trading company Vitol is involved in
financing the project. Iran also plans to boost capacity at its
northern refineries at Arak, Tabriz, and Tehran to about 800,000
bbl/d in order to process this oil. Currently, however, despite
capacity of around 50,000 bbl/d, only 15,000-20,000 bbl/d of Turkmen
oil are being shipped to Neka, and then on to Tehran by the existing
Neka-Tehran pipeline. An equivalent amount of Iranian oil is then
made available for export via Kharg Island terminal on the Persian
Gulf.
NATURAL
GAS
Iran
contains an estimated 812 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in proven natural
gas reserves -- the world's second largest and surpassed only by
those found in Russia. The bulk of Iranian natural gas reserves
are located in non-associated fields, and have not been developed,
meaning that Iran has huge potential for gas development. Besides
domestic consumption, which is expected to increase more than 70%
by 2005, Iran also has the potential to be a large natural gas exporter.
In 1999, Iran produced about 1.9 Tcf of natural gas. Currently,
natural gas accounts for around 44% of Iran's total energy consumption,
but the government plans billions of dollars worth of investment
in the gas sector during its current Five-Year Development Plan.
Iran's
largest non-associated natural gas field is South Pars, geologically
an extension of Qatar's 241-Tcf North Field. South Pars was first
identified in 1988 and originally appraised at 128 Tcf in the early
1990s. Current estimates are that South Pars contains around 280
Tcf of gas, of which a large fraction will be recoverable, and over
17 billion barrels of liquids. Development of South Pars is Iran's
largest energy project, and already has attracted around $20 billion
in investment. Gas from South Pars largely is slated to be shipped
north via the planned 56-inch, $500 million, IGAT-3 pipeline (a
section of which is now being built by Russian and local contractors),
as well as a possible IGAT-4 line, and then reinjected to boost
oil output at the mature Aghajari field (output peaked at 1 million
bbl/d in 1974, but has since fallen to 200,000 bbl/d), and possibly
the Ahwaz and Mansouri fields (which make up part of the huge Bangestan
reservoir in the southwest Khuzestan region). South Pars gas also
could be exported, both by pipeline and possibly by liquefied natural
gas (LNG) tanker.
On
September 29, 1997, Total (now TotalFinaElf) signed a $2-billion
deal (along with Russia's Gazprom and Malaysia's Petronas) to explore
South Pars and to help develop the field during Phase 2 and 3 of
its development. NIOC estimates that South Pars has a natural gas
production potential of up to 8 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d)
from four individual reservoirs. Phase 1, which is being handled
by Petropars (owned 60% by NIOC), has been delayed several times
and now is scheduled for partial completion by the end of 2002,
involves production of 900 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) of
natural gas and 40,000 bbl/d of condensate. This first phase is
being carried out by the Petroleum Development and Engineering Company
(PEDEC), an affiliate of NIOC, while TotalFinaElf's consortium is
responsible for Phases 2 and 3. In August 1999, Total signed a $110-million
contract with Hyundai Heavy Industries for construction of twin
undersea pipelines from South Pars to onshore facilities at Assaluyeh.
Work also has begun (also by Hyundai) on a major terminal at Assaluyeh
to handle South Pars production from phases 2 and 3. Phases 4 and
5, estimated to cost $1.9 billion each, are being handled by ENI
and Petropars, and involve construction (by Aip and Petropars) of
onshore treatment facilities at the port of Bandar Assaluyeh. Phases
6 through 8, which are to produce a combined 3 Bcf/d of gas and
120,000 bbl/d of condensate, are being handled by Petropars and,
in part, by the UK's Enterprise Oil (which has a 20% stake), while
several international bidders reportedly have been short-listed
for phases 9 through 12 (in early 2001, Chevron reportedly withdrew
its bid on these phases). Phases 9 and 10 are expected to supply
the domestic market while phases 11 and 12 are slated for LNG export.
Companies reportedly interested in all or parts of phases 9-12 (expected
to cost $4 billion) include BG, TotalFinaElf, Petronas, and Shell.
In
addition to South Pars, the 48-Tcf North Pars development may also
be part of Iran's long-term natural gas utilization plans. Development
plans call for 3.6 Bcf/d of natural gas production, of which 1.2
Bcf/d would be re-injected into the onshore Gachsaran, Bibi Hakimeh,
and Binak oil fields. The other 2.4 Bcf/d would be sent to the more
mature Agha Jari oil field. Negotiations on the field stalled in
1995, but Shell reportedly renewed its interest in 1998. A feasibility
study on the field is scheduled to be completed in late 2001, and
will determine whether or not North Pars natural gas is needed for
injection into mature southern oil fields.
Besides
North and South Pars, Iran aims to develop the 6.4-Tcf, non-associated
Khuff (Dalan) reservoir of the Salman oil field. Salman straddles
Iran's maritime border with Abu Dhabi, where it is known as the
Abu Koosh field. NIOC is seeking to develop the Khuff reservoir,
which could lead to the production of 500 Mmcf/d of non-associated
natural gas, along with the 120,000 bbl/d of crude oil that is now
being produced from a shallower reservoir. Salman natural gas could
either be exported to Dubai's Jebel Ali or to domestic locations
at Qeshm Island and Badar Mogham. The project cost is estimated
at slightly under $600 million for a two-platform development.
Iran
has made several significant natural gas field discoveries over
the past year or so. These include: the 800-Bcf Zireh field in Bushehr
province; the 4-Tcf Homa field in southern Fars province; the huge,
14-Tcf Tabnak natural gas field located in southern Iran. Iran's
other sizable non-associated natural gas reserves include the offshore
47-Tcf North Pars natural gas field (a separate structure from South
Pars), the onshore Nar-Kangan fields, the 13-Tcf Aghar and Dalan
fields in Fars province, and the Sarkhoun and Mand fields.
The
dual Aghar-Dalan field development has been one of National Iranian
Gas Company's recent successful natural gas utilization projects.
Since coming online in mid-1995, the Aghar and Dalan fields have
produced approximately 600 Mmcf/d and 800 Mmcf/d, respectively.
Natural gas from both fields is processed at a $300-million gas
processing facility at the Dalan field, which is also the location
of a 40-MW, natural-gas-fired power plant. Most of the treated natural
gas from the Dalan processing plant is carried through a 212-mile
pipeline for re-injection in the Marun field and other oil fields
in Khuzestan province.
Natural
Gas Trade
Although
Iranian domestic consumption is growing rapidly, Iran continues
to promote export markets for its natural gas. Possibilities include
Turkey, Armenia, Ukraine (Kiev reportedly is interested in building
an Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Crimea-Ukraine line), Europe (possibly via
Ukraine), Pakistan, India, Taiwan, South Korea, and coastal China.
These exports could be either via pipeline or by LNG tanker, with
possible LNG export terminals at Asaluyeh or Kish Island. Although
India and Iran in 1993 signed a memorandum of understanding on an
overland natural gas pipeline, regional political and security concerns
to date have blocked completion of a feasibility study. Reportedly,
Pakistan and Iran at one point had agreed to a natural gas line
from South Pars to Multan, Pakistan, with a possible extension to
Hazipur-Bijapur-Jagdishpur in northern India. In early February
2001, there were reports that India and Iran were negotiating over
an offshore gas pipeline option, which would run from Iran to Gujarat,
India. However, this could be much more costly and technically difficult
than an overland line. Also, problems at India's Dabhol natural
gas power facility have called into question the financial viability
of India's LNG import plans. In other news, in August 2001, NIOC
awarded Japan's JGC and France's Technip a "front-end" engineering
and design contract for an 8-9 million-ton-per-year LNG export plant.
This is Iran's third ongoing LNG export project, although it is
more likely that only one or possibly two will go forward.
In
1996, Iran and Turkey signed a $20-billion agreement that calls
for Iran to supply Turkey with natural gas over a period of 22 years.
Exports of Iranian natural gas to Turkey were slated to start in
1999 at an initial rate of 300 Mmcf/d and rise to a level of 1,000
Mmcf/d in 2005. In November 1998, Turkey began construction of a
623-mile pipeline that could transport natural gas westward from
Iran. In January 2000, Iran said that it accepted Turkey's request
to delay the purchase of Iranian natural gas until September 2001
(on August 2, 2000, the two countries signed a protocol for pumping
to begin on July 30, 2001). Turkey said that it had been unable
to complete its portion of the pipeline due to economic problems.
In August 2001, the pipeline opening was delayed once again, with
deliveries now set to begin in early December 2001.
In
July 2000, Iran's Oil Minister Zanganeh stated that Iran was open
to selling gas to Kuwait. Iran has been involved in a border dispute
with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over demarcation of the border through
the northern Gulf continental shelf. This region contains the huge
(7-13 Tcf) Dorra gas field, which Iran had begun drilling in early
2000 but stopped after complaints by Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
signed a bilateral agreement in July 2000 on dividing up the Dorra
gas field equally between the two countries, and now are working
on a final deal with Iran. Besides Kuwait, Iran also is reported
to have discussed possible gas exports to the United Arab Emirates,
although in April 2001, NIOC denied such a plan, as has Crescent
Petroleum, the UAE company reportedly involved in the deal.
Besides
natural gas exports, Iran also has discussed importing natural gas
from Azerbaijan, and already imports some natural gas from Turkmenistan.
This natural gas is for use in Iran's northern areas, far from the
country's main natural gas reserves in the south. Natural gas imports
from Turkmenistan doubled in early 2001, reaching nearly 80 Bcf
in the first half of the year, via the Korpeje-Kurt Kui pipeline.
Development
Of Gas-Pipeline Network
The
capacity of the refineries in Iran in 1999 was stepped up by 9 percent
in comparison with the figures for 1998. The refineries' capacities
was boosted to 183 million cubic meters per day.
In
the sector for the transfer of the natural gas in 1999, about 933
kilometers of pipelines for high-pressure natural gas was laid down.
This figure is 25 percent more than that for 1998. By and large,
by the end of 1999 a total of 12,730 kilometers of high-pressure
natural-gas pipelines were laid down.
In
1999, another 4,400 kilometers of new pipelines were added to the
distribution system. This shows a growth of 50 percent in comparison
to the performances of 1998. At the end of this year the total natural
gas-pipeline networks was increased to 51,000 kilometers.
In
1999, with a growth of 27 percent comparing with that of 1998, a
total of 261,000 new natural gas-outlet connections were permitted
in the country. The total outlet connections in the country reached
3 million at the end of 1999.
In
this manner, in 1999 the benefits of the natural gas became available
to close to 544,000 new families, while at the same time the total
families enjoying this blessing peaked at 6 million.
At
the same time, with the 24 new urban areas which were settled in
1999, the number of the towns which were connected to the system
of natural gas-transfer network reached to a total of 346.
Supply
Of Natural Gas To Industries,Industrial Townships And Power Plants
Transfer
of natural gas to industries, industrial townships and power plants,
has been among the priorities of the National Iranian Gas Co (NIGC)
in recent years.
Until
the end of 1998, the aggregate number of units using natural gas
has come to 1,860 units.
In
1999, natural gas was transferred to 548 new industrial units and
as a result the number of the big industrial consumers was increased
to more than 2,400 units. Also transfer of natural gas to 28 industrial
townships was put on the NIGC's agenda by then.
By
the end of 1999, 16 industrial townships had been supplied by piped
natural gas. The remaining industrial townships will have natural
gas by the current Iranian year end (March 20, 2001).
In
1999 and in continuation of completing the transformation of the
power plants by making them natural gas-operated, 31 power plants
were made gas efficient and received natural gas. At present, about
92 percent of the thermal power plants of the country operate on
natural gas.
The
consumption of natural gas in the power plants of the country attained
9 percent growth in 1999 and reached 21.9 billion cubic meters.
The natural gas consumption share of the power plants in the consumption
basket of the power plants during the recent years has climbed to
80 percent from 61 percent at the beginning of the 2nd 5-Year Economic
Development Plan (March 1995-2000).
By
and large, the production of natural gas in 1999 was afforded a
considerable growth reaching 13.8 percent compared with the previous
year. The production was bolstered from 50.8 billion cubic meters
to 57.8 billion cubic meters. The consumption of natural gas instead
of replacement energies has led to a reduction of consumption in
kerosene by 13.2 percent, 5 percent in diesel fuel, and 16 percent
in furnace fuel during that year in comparison with the figures
for 1998.
Power
plants rank first in consumption of natural gas and in 1999 close
to 39 percent of total consumed natural gas was allocated to this
sector. The household, and commercial and industrial sectors rank
next with 33 percent and 28 percent respectively.
In
1999 the industrial sector had a consumption growth rate of 19 percent
and therefore allocated the highest rate of consumption to itself
in 1998.
The
replacement of other energy sources with natural gas in 1999 was
equivalent to 367 million barrels of crude oil and this gave rise
to a saving of $2 billion.
Natural
Gas and 2nd And 3rd Development Plans
During
the 2nd Plan, the capacity of the existing refineries in the country
was bolstered by more than 60 million cubic meters per day and close
to 3,700 kilometers of gas-transfer pipelines were added to the
gas distribution system. While the efforts for network establishments
and installation of gas connections were more than 7 percent and
29 percent respectively.
On
the other hand, about 15,000 kilometers of network installation
and more than 1 million new gas connections were added to the gas
distribution system in this period.
Meanwhile,
some of the qualitative objectives of the gas sector in the country's
3rd 5-Year Economic Development Plan are to be mentioned as follows:
- Boosting
of the natural gas share in securing the energy needs of the country
to the optimal point;
- Securing
the security and optimization of the natural gas supply system;
- Cost-effective
administration of different units in the gas sector;
- Optimal
consumption of natural gas resources;
- Promotion
of Iranian gas-industry in international energy trade;
- Promotion
of the service quality to consumers of the natural gas; and
- Promotion
of Training and Research in the Gas Industry.
Up-To-Dating
Of The Gas Industry
- The
effecting of structural changes.
This task was implemented in 1999 by relegating
the authorities and responsibilities within the framework of subcompanies,
including five gas-refinery companies and 25 provincial gas-distribution
companies, and all the authorities were compiled on the general
principles.
- Preparation
of a suitable ground for promotion of human resources qualities
In 1999 the ratio of consumed natural gas
to the manpower went up by 88 percent from 1.8 million cubic meter/employed-person
at the beginning of the Second Plan to 3.3 million cubic meter/employed-person
and the common ratio to the manpower increased by 83 percent from
124 subscriber/employed-person at the beginning of the Second Plan
to 227 subscriber/employed-person in 1999.
- Establishment
of Research and Development (R&D) system
- Creation
of a suitable condition for promotion of scientific knowledge,
self-sufficiency and self-dependency in activities related to
the natural gas distribution.
The NIGC has already arrived at 90 percent
self-sufficiency in production of items needed for urban gas distribution.
Some other variables which can help promote
the process of up-to-dating of the gas industry effectively are:
- Completion
of the national dispatching system;
- Promotion
of security levels and maintenance of the gas distribution system;
- Improvement
of the services to the subscribers in order to secure the safety
of all in the society;
- Promotion
of the training and research levels; and
- Creation
of suitable grounds for cooperation of different entities and
institutions in the country with the NIGC.
Natural
Gas Exports
Although
consumption is growing rapidly, Iran continues to promote export
markets for its natural gas. Possibilities include Turkey, Europe,
Pakistan, India, Taiwan, South Korea, and coastal China, either
via pipeline or LNG tanker. Although India and Iran in 1993 signed
a memorandum of understanding on an overland gas pipeline, regional
political tensions (e.g. between India and Pakistan) to date have
blocked completion of a feasibility study. Reportedly, Pakistan
and Iran also had agreed to a gas line from South Pars to Multan,
Pakistan, with a possible extension to Hazipur-Bijapur-Jagdishpur
in northern India. A deep water gas pipeline from Iran to India
also has been discussed, although this would be very expensive (several
times the cost of an overland line) and technically difficult.
In
1996, Iran and Turkey signed a $20-billion agreement that calls
for Iran to supply Turkey with natural gas over a period of 22 years.
Exports of Iranian gas to Turkey were slated to start in 1999 at
an initial rate of 300 Mmcf/d and rise to a level of 1,000 Mmcf/d
in 2005. In November 1998, Turkey began construction of a 623-mile
pipeline that could transport gas westward from Iran. In January
2000, Iran said that it accepted Turkey's request to delay the purchase
of Iranian natural gas until September 2001 (on August 2, 2000,
the two countries signed a protocol for pumping to begin on July
30, 2001). Turkey said that it had been unable to complete its portion
of the pipeline due to economic problems.
In
July 2000, Iran's Oil Minister Zanganeh stated that Iran was open
to selling gas to Kuwait. Iran has been involved in a border dispute
with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over demarcation of the border through
the northern Gulf continental shelf. This region contains the huge
(7-13 Tcf) Dorra gas field, which Iran had begun drilling in early
2000 but stopped after complaints by Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
signed a bilateral agreement in July 2000 on dividing up the Dorra
gas field equally between the two countries, and now are working
on a final deal with Iran.
NEW
FIELD DEVELOPMENTS PROJECTS
On
September 29, 1997, Total (now TotalFinaElf) signed a $2-billion
deal (along with Russia's Gazprom and Malaysia's Petronas) to explore
South Pars and to help develop the field during Phase 2 and 3 of
its development. NIOC estimates that South Pars has a gas production
potential of up to 8 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) from four
individual reservoirs, possibly beginning in 2001. Phase 1, currently
scheduled for completion by the end of 2000, involves production
of 900 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) of natural gas and 40,000
bbl/d of condensate. This first phase is being carried out by the
Petroleum Development and Engineering Company (PEDEC), an affiliate
of NIOC, while TotalFinaElf's consortium is responsible for Phases
2 and 3. In August 1999, Total signed a $110-million contract with
Hyundai Heavy Industries for construction of twin undersea pipelines
from South Pars to onshore facilities at Assaluyeh. Work also has
begun (also by Hyundai) on a major terminal at Assaluyeh to handle
South Pars production from phases 2 and 3. As of early September
2000, reports indicated that phases 2 and 3 were ahead of schedule
and would come online by September 2001.
In
addition to South Pars, Iran aims to develop the 6.4-Tcf, non-associated
Khuff (Dalan) reservoir of the Salman oil field. Salman straddles
Iran's maritime border with Abu Dhabi, where it is known as the
Abu Koosh field. NIOC is seeking to develop the Khuff reservoir,
which could lead to the production of 500 Mmcf/d of non-associated
gas, along with the 120,000 bbl/d of crude oil that is now being
produced from a shallower reservoir. Salman gas could either be
exported to Dubai's Jebel Ali or to domestic locations at Qeshm
Island and Badar Mogham. The project cost is estimated at slightly
under $600 million for a two-platform development.
The
47-Tcf North Pars development will be integral to Iran's long-term
gas utilization plans. Development plans call for 3.6 Bcf/d of gas
production, of which 1.2 Bcf/d would be re-injected into the onshore
Gachsaran, Bibi Hakimeh, and Binak oil fields. The other 2.4 Bcf/d
would be sent to the more mature Agha Jari oil field. Negotiations
on the field stalled in 1995, but Shell reportedly renewed its interest
in 1998.
During
2000, Iran made several significant gas field discoveries. These
include: the 800-Bcf Zireh field, located north of the Kangan field
in the province of Bushehr; the 4-Tcf Homa field in southern Fars
province; the huge, 14-Tcf Tabnak gas field located in southern
Iran.
In
July 2000, Italian firm ENI signed a $3.8-billion deal with Iran
to develop the South Pars region for gas. The deal reportedly was
the largest between Iran and a foreign company since the 1979 Islamic
Revolution.
OIL
AND GAS INDUSTRIES
Organizations:
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) - oil and gas exploration and
production, refining and oil transportation (reportedly reorganized
in September 2000); National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) - manages
gathering, treatment, processing, transmission, distribution, and
exports of gas and gas liquids; National Petrochemical Company (NPC)
- handles petrochemical production, distribution, and exports.
Major
Foreign Oil Company Involvement: BG,
ENI, Gazprom, Petronas, Royal Dutch/Shell, TotalFinaElf
Major Oil Fields:
Gachsaran, Marun, Ahwaz Bangestan, Agha Jari, Rag-e-Safid, Parsi,
Bibi Hakimeh
Major Refineries (capacity, bbl/d) (1/1/00E):
Abadan (400,000), Isfahan (265,000), Bandar Abbas (232,000); Tehran
(225,000), Arak (150,000), Tabriz (112,000), Shiraz 40,000), Kermanshah
(30,000), Lavan Island (20,000)
Major
Oil Terminals:Ganaveh, Kharg Island,
Lavan Island, Sirri Island, Cyrus, Ras Bahregan, Larak Island
Gas
Pipeline System: IGAT-1 transports
associated gas from Khuzestan area oilfields to consumption centers
in the north; IGAT-2 transports non-associated gas from the Kangan
and Nar fields on the Persian Gulf coast near Bandar Taheri; IGAT-3,
which would run from South Pars to Tehran, is planned.
ENVIRONMENT
In
the context of its oil-based economy, environmental issues in Iran
only recently have become important. Ongoing air pollution in urban
areas, which reached a crisis level in Tehran in December 1999,
have highlighted the need to improve Iran's environmental record.
The rush to develop oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea makes
oil pollution in the Caspian a real environmental threat.
Huge
increases in energy consumption over the past 20 years have contributed
greatly to pollution levels as Iran's carbon emissions have nearly
tripled over the same time span. Large numbers of old, inefficient
cars on the road lacking catalytic converters account for much of
the country's air pollution. Together with the widespread use of
low-quality, leaded gasoline, this combination has led to noxious,
black smoke spewing from cars creating a cloud of smog above many
cities, especially Tehran.
In
addition, Iran's abundance of fossil fuel resources has tended to
discourage the country's incentive to shift to cleaner alternative
energy sources for its energy needs. As Iran continues to struggle
with air pollution in the 21st century, however, the country likely
will need to take a variety of tough measures in order to avert
an environmental crisis.
Energy-Related
Carbon Emissions (1998E): 79.4 million
metric tons of carbon (1.3% of world carbon emissions)
Per Capita Energy Consumption (1998E):
72.4 million Btu (vs US value of 350.7 million Btu)
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